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Abstract—Since the late 90’s, the Internet topology discovery
has been an attractive and important research topic, leading,
among others, to multiple probing and data analysis tools
developed by the research community. This paper looks at the
particular problem of discovering subnets (i.e., a set of devices
that are located on the same connection medium and that can
communicate directly with each other at the link layer).
In this paper, we first show that the use of traffic engineering
policies may increase the difficulty of subnet inference. We care-
fully characterize those difficulties and quantify their prevalence
in the wild. Next, we introduce WISE (Wide and lInear Subnet
inferencE), a novel tool for subnet inference designed to deal
with those issues and able to discover subnets on wide ranges of
IP addresses in a linear time. Using two groundtruth networks,
we demonstrate that WISE performs better than state-of-the-art
tools while being competitive in terms of subnet accuracy. We
also show, through large-scale measurements, that the selection
of vantage point with WISE does not matter in terms of subnet
accuracy. Finally, all our code (WISE, data processing, results
plotting) and collected data are freely available.
I. INTRODUCTION
For now nearly two decades, the Internet topology has
been investigated at multiple levels [1]. The most basic point
of view is the IP interface level where data is revealed
through hop-by-hop exploration performed by traceroute
and variants (see, e.g., Paris traceroute [2]). Second,
multiple interfaces of a given router might be aggregated
into a single identifier thanks to alias resolution. Finally, the
higher level would be the Autonomous System (AS) level
which models relationships between ASes and is captured, for
instance, through BGP routing information.
Besides this academic view of the Internet topology, new
intermediate levels have emerged over time. For instance,
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) [3], [4] or Points-of-Presence
(PoPs) [5], [6] are more and more investigated. This paper is
in the scope of an another intermediate level: sub-networks (or,
more simply, subnets), i.e., a set of devices that are located
on the same connection medium and that can communicate
directly with each other at the link layer [7]. Exploring subnets
is a way to enrich router level maps by providing particular
topological features of ISP networks.
Standard techniques for revealing subnets are based on
active probing and on-the-fly complex rules for building each
subnet [8], [9], [10]. However, those tools fail to reveal
accurate subnets in the presence of traffic engineering policies,
such as load balancing [11], applied by domains.
In this paper, we first review the most common phenomena
which increase the difficulty of subnet inference for classical
tools and elaborate on what kind of traffic engineering policies
could cause them. Second, we introduce a novel tool, WISE
(Wide and lInear Subnet inferencE), which is designed to
detect these phenomena and take them into account upon
discovering subnets. WISE not only carefully evaluates the IP
addresses considered for subnet inference, but it also achieves
it without additional probing and in linear time (i.e., the
execution time will be proportional to the amount of addresses
considered for subnet inference). Indeed, WISE is built to first
collect the data it needs for subnet inference , while previous
state-of-the-art tools [8], [9], [10] usually discovers subnets
while probing.
Our contributions include a first characterization and evalua-
tion of modern subnet inference challenges, a new tool (WISE)
that can work around these issues while performing overall
better than state-of-the-art tools and an evaluation of the
effects of changing the vantage point from one measurement
to another, as encountered traffic engineering issues will likely
change as well. With this, we demonstrate that WISE can
usually withstand vantage point change pretty well despite
some punctual drastic updates in the collected data. The source
code of WISE, our figures, and the scripts for generating them
(or scheduling a campaign) are all available online. 1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
discusses and quantifies challenges faced by traditional subnet
inference tools; Sec. III introduces WISE, our novel subnet
inference tool; Sec. IV validates WISE with respect to state-
of-the-art tools based on two groundtruths; Sec. V evaluates
WISE performance in the wild; finally, Sec. VI concludes this
paper by summarizing its main achievements.
II. SUBNET INFERENCE CHALLENGES
In this section, we discuss the different challenges that can
arise when one attempts to infer the subnets contained in a
target domain.
A. State-of-the-Art inference
A subnetwork, or subnet, consists in a set of devices, each
of them being identified by a unique IP address, that all are
connected together through the same connection medium. In
the Internet, a subnet can be a point-to-point link as well as
a local area network (LAN) isolated in the network topology.
From a measurement perspective, in the (near) absence of any
traffic engineering, subnet interfaces will appear as a set of
interfaces that are consecutive with respect to the IP scope, that
are located at the same distance in Time-To-Live (or TTL), i.e.,
the minimal TTL value to use to get a reply from the subnet,
and that are reached through the same route in the network
1https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE
topology, i.e., the last interface appearing in the route towards
each subnet interface is the same for each route.
Ideally, a subnet should also contain at least one interface
that belongs to the last router crossed before entering the
subnet, and which therefore appears one hop closer to the
measurement vantage point than other subnet interfaces. In
TraceNET [8] and ExploreNET [9] terminology (as well
as TreeNET [10]), interfaces belonging to the subnet that
are not located on the last crossed router are called pivot
interfaces while the interface(s) located on this router are
called contra-pivot interfaces, as illustrated in Fig. 1 (pivots
are white squares, while contra-pivots are depicted by gray
squares). It should be noted that, while having a single contra-
pivot interface makes more sense at first glance, it is actually
possible to find more than one contra-pivot because routers
may implement back-up interfaces to reach critical subnets. In
practice, we have observed such a scenario in the groundtruth
we used for our validation (see Sec. IV).
All state-of-the-art tools take advantage of those ideas to
reveal subnets. TraceNET uses traceroute-like probing
towards a set of target IP addresses and, then, analyzes the
collected routes to identify the subnets crossed to reach the
destinations. ExploreNET probes a growing range of IP
addresses consecutively (starting with a single initial target,
then building a /31 or /30, then a /29, etc.) to build a subnet
that keeps expanding as long as a few rules are fulfilled and as
long as responsive interfaces can be found. Finally, TreeNET
builds itself upon ExploreNET and provides algorithmic
corrections to better identify larger subnets, specially when
the probed subnet lacks of responsive interfaces.
It should be noted that subnet inference has also been
explored with passive techniques, with tools that require to
send multiple probes in the network but with additional post-
processing (without probing) to infer the subnets. For instance,
IGMP probing [12] allows to reveal subnets by applying
several rules (e.g., routers must be connected through the same
Layer-2 device) to the collected data. However, nowadays,
IGMP probing is not anymore useful as it is heavily filtered
by operators [13].
B. Subnet Inference Obstacles
Unfortunately, no matter the tool, state-of-the-art subnet
inference relies on strong hypotheses. For instance, all tools
assume that interfaces from a given subnet will necessarily
appear at the same distance in term of minimal TTL, and that
the last hop before these interfaces will also be the same. We
identify no less than three phenomena that have the potential
to violate those assumptions: flickering IP addresses, warping
IP addresses, and echoing IP addresses.
Before describing those phenomena, we introduce the notion
of trail. A trail denotes the last interface seen in the route
(obtained by performing traceroute-like probing) before a
given target IP address. However, the last interface in the route
towards a given target address is not always visible. Therefore,
we generalize the notion of trail such that it corresponds to
the last non-anonymous and not cycling interface in the route
(a) Flickering IP addresses. (b) Warping IP addresses.
Fig. 1. Issues with the last interface(s) before the subnet (plain bullets). Plain
and dashed paths are different routes.
towards the target IP address. In addition, we also associate
to the trail the amount of subsequent hops that are either
anonymous hops or cycling hops, called anomalies.
Flickering and warping are potential artifacts of IP load-
balancing occurring just before the IP interfaces that appear
in trails. IP load-balancing [11] leads to a subgraph that is
delimited by a divergence point (the router performing the
load-balancing, e.g., R1 in Fig. 1) followed, two or more
hops later, by a convergence point (e.g., R4 in Fig. 1a and
R5 in Fig. 1b). This subgraph forms a diamond with multiple
branches between the divergence and convergence point. Au-
gustin et al. [11] considered a diamond being symmetric if all
parallel paths feature the same number of hops, otherwise it
is said to be asymmetric.
On one hand, flickering, as illustrated in Fig. 1a, refers to
a situation in which we observe multiple IP addresses acting
as the trail for pivot interfaces of a given subnet, all of them
being located at the same distance (in terms of TTL) from the
vantage point. We say these addresses are flickering because
they usually appear in turns if we consider a bunch of subnet
interfaces that are close and consecutive regarding the address
space. We believe that flickering is mainly caused by symmet-
ric load-balanced paths. Performing alias resolution between
flickering addresses can confirm this assumption: in several of
our measurements of the autonomous system AS6453 (Tata
Communications), we were able to alias together more than
half of the detected flickering addresses. It was achieved by
using an alias resolution framework originally implemented in
TreeNET [14]. It consists (to put it simply) in fingerprinting
IP addresses [15] that could be aliases of each other to select
the most suited state-of-the-art alias resolution method. In the
case of AS6453, most addresses were aliased with Ally [16]
and iffinder [17], both methods being usually very reliable
on small sets of IP addresses. For instance, on February 19th,
2019, 37 addresses out of the 62 detected flickering interfaces
could be aliased together, and there were as much as 84 aliased
addresses on a total of 119 on the next day (the measurement
(a) AS6453 (December 2018). (b) AS3257 (December 2018).
Fig. 2. Problematic trails over time.
being done from a different vantage point). 2
On the other hand, warping (illustrated in Fig. 1b) is likely
caused by asymmetric load-balancing. We indeed see the same
IP address acting as the trail for the pivot interfaces of a given
subnet while being observed at different distances (in terms
of TTL), depending on the pivot. In such a scenario, pivot
interfaces and their respective trails are thus reached through
different routes whose lengths vary from one probe to another.
Finally, echoing refers to a very specific issue that is the
consequence of the configuration of some specific brands of
routers. Upon the reception of a packet targeting a close-
by interface (i.e., one hop away) whose the TTL value has
expired, these routers will reply with a time-exceeded
message in which the source IP address will be the target
itself rather than an interface of the replying router. As a
consequence, the IP address acting as the trail is not an
interface of the ingress router (i.e., the last router crossed
before the subnet) but the target address itself. We therefore
say the trail is echoing the target.
C. Inference Obstacles in the Wild
During Fall 2018, we measured 22 different ASes (i.e.,
Autonomous Systems) from 22 different vantage points in the
PlanetLab testbed in order to quantify flickering, warping, and
echoing. Measurements were performed on a daily basis and
each target AS was probed by a different vantage point over
the various runs. Doing so, we were able to investigate how
the choice of a Vantage Point may impact flickering, warping,
and echoing.
For each target AS, we plot a figure in which we show,
for each collected dataset (X-Axis – dataset date in DD/MM
format), the ratio of trails (Y-Axis) suffering from flickering
(dotted line), warping (plain line), and echoing (dashed line).
We computed a ratio as the number of trails suffering from a
given issue to the total number of discovered trails (the same
trail may thus appear multiple times). We do so to avoid under-
evaluating warping and flickering. Indeed, as echoing trails are
almost always unique, they would appear as over-represented
with a ratio based on unique trails, while, in practice, they
appear for much less target IP addresses than both warping
and flickering.
Due to space constraints, we will focus, in this paper,
on typical cases. We therefore encourage readers to check
2Cfr. https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Dataset/AS6453/
2019/02
our public repository 3 to get access to all figures (but also
our scripts and datasets). Fig. 2a shows the extent of all
three issues for AS6453, using datasets collected from late
November 2018 to shortly before Christmas 2018. With the
exception of one dataset collected from a vantage point that
had poor reachability (December 17th), all issues appear in
almost every dataset. Three spikes (corresponding in practice
to six datasets) are visible and are due to warping trails ratio
drastically increasing. Interestingly, the flickering ratio also
spikes but only for three of these six datasets, and stays below
20% (a fairly common observation with this particular AS) for
the first "hill" observed for warping trails. This supports the
idea that both issues are caused by different kinds of traffic
engineering (most probably load-balancing), as we discussed
in Sec. II-B.
For the sake of comparison, we also provide results for
AS3257 (GTT Communications) in Fig. 2b. Here, a large
majority of trails correspond to warping trails, no matter the
vantage point (first and last dataset corresponding to PlanetLab
nodes located at that same geographical location with poor
reachability). However, the ratio of trails which corresponds to
flickering trails vary a lot from one dataset to another, further
supporting our hypothesis that both warping and flickering are
the results of different traffic engineering strategies. We finally
note that there is a low, yet noticeable amount of echoing trails
in all datasets. The weak variations might be simply explained
by the fact that the total of responsive interfaces vary from
one dataset to another. Likewise, in the case of AS6453, the
small spikes in echoing trails match datasets that contained
more responsive interfaces. In other words, the presence of
echoing trails is likely not a consequence of traffic engineering,
but rather a matter of what kind of device is used in the
surroundings of target addresses.
III. WISE
In order to address carefully the issues described up to
this point, we introduce a new tool called Wide and lInear
Subnet inferencE (WISE). Not only WISE is designed to
provide a renewed subnet inference taking account of the
issues previously discussed, but it is also designed to discover
subnets on wide ranges of IP addresses in a linear time. Indeed,
despite using multi-threading and sometimes implementing
heuristics to speed up subnet inference, state-of-the-art tools
such as TreeNET [10] can still require either several days
of measurements, or several vantage points in order to fully
measure a target domain whose prefixes cover several millions
of IP addresses. Such an amount of resources can be a problem
to schedule large measurement campaigns. This is why WISE
also puts the emphasis on achieving linear complexity for all
its major algorithmic steps (Sec. III-D).
Indeed, given a set of target IPv4 prefixes4 belonging to the
target domain5, WISE works as a succession of three stages:
target pre-scanning (Sec. III-A), target scanning (Sec. III-B),
3https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Obstacles
4WISE is currently only implemented for IPv4.
5e.g., prefixes listed for the selected AS on http://bgp.he.net
and finally the subnet inference itself (Sec. III-C). It is worth
noting that the two first stages are the only algorithmic steps
requiring active probing. Due to space constraints, we will not
cover all the algorithms implemented by WISE in details in
this paper and we will stick to the main and most important
ideas. Interested readers can, of course, review the source code
to learn more about the matter.6
A. Target Pre-Scanning
The first step towards subnet inference, the aggregation of
IP interfaces under a single identifier on the basis of their
network location, is to check which IP addresses are alive
and reachable. This is the objective pursued by “target pre-
scanning”: it works by sending a single probe (typically an
ICMP one but UDP and TCP can also be considered) with
a large enough TTL value towards every possible IP address
encompassed by the initial target prefixes and awaits for a
reply. If no reply is received within a given delay, the target
address will not be probed in subsequent steps.
In practice, WISE conducts pre-scanning by listing all target
addresses and sharing the probing load between multiple
threads in order to speed up the whole process. WISE also
does a second pre-scanning only with unresponsive addresses
(during the first measurement round). This second run is still
scheduled with multiple threads but with the initial timeout
value doubled. This ensures unresponsive addresses are indeed
dead and not unreachable because of some particular network
conditions. Notice that WISE may allow a third pre-scanning
run at user’s will. However, two rounds should be enough.7
B. Target Scanning
Once all responsive addresses have been collected by WISE,
the next step consists in collecting the data required for
subnet inference (the so-called “target scanning”). We are only
interested by two pieces of information: an estimation of the
target distance as a minimal TTL value and its trail, as defined
in Sec. II-B. To obtain this information, for every IP address
in the target domain, WISE performs hop-limited probing (i.e.,
traceroute) and stops when it has received its first reply
from the targeted IP address. Then, WISE performs some
backward probing (i.e., from the target back to the vantage
point) to ensure no reply could be obtained closer to the
vantage point. Interfaces revealed along the path are used to
both estimate the distance in TTL and find the trail.
In practice, WISE does not perform a complete
traceroute towards each target IP address. Indeed,
IP addresses are ranged in increasing order, based on their
numerical equivalent. Consequently, when WISE knows the
TTL distance required to reach a given IP address, it uses
this TTL in the first probe towards the next IP address in the
list, then adjust with possible additional forward/backward
probing depending on the first probe outcome.
6https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/v1/
7It should be noted that pre-scanning is not novel, as it was already
implemented and used with success with TreeNET [10].
The overall process is further sped up with multi-threading,
and completed with a second measurement round to minimize
the amount of situations where the last hops towards a given
target address are anonymous hops or cycles.
At the end of the target scanning, WISE processes the
data it collected in order to detect all flickering, warping,
or echoing trails. In particular, it will make a census of
all flickering trails and group these addresses depending on
other addresses they are flickering with. On that basis, it
will conduct alias resolution on each group to ensure we
are in the scenario described in Sec. II-B or if the flickering
is caused by something else (in which case WISE will not
make any risky hypothesis during the subnet inference). The
alias resolution currently implemented in WISE re-uses a
methodology introduced by TreeNET, mainly using network
fingerprinting [15] as a way to select the most suitable state-
of-the-art alias resolution technique for a selection of aliasable
interfaces [14].
C. Subnet inference with WISE
The subnet inference essentially consists in processing the
scanned IP addresses after sorting them with respect to the
IP scope (i.e., sorted according to their value as a 32-bit
integer) to discover the subnets that best accommodate subsets
of consecutive addresses. More precisely, WISE typically starts
by removing an address from the sorted list, builds a /32
subnet for it, then progressively decreases its prefix length
and retrieves from the initial list all interfaces that are encom-
passed by the expanded subnet. It then proceeds to check if
encompassed addresses are indeed on the same subnet, also
checking if some contra-pivot(s) is (are) among them. Next, it
evaluates the situation as a whole to decide whether the prefix
length should be decreased furthermore or if the expansion
of the subnet should be stopped, with or without increasing
once its prefix length (i.e., subnet shrinkage). This will notably
occur if newly encompassed addresses are incompatible with
the subnet being inferred.
To check if an address belongs to the subnet, WISE selects
the first pivot IP interface in the initial subnet (denoted as
a reference pivot) then compares the newly encompassed
interfaces (named candidate interfaces) with it. To decide
whether a candidate interface and the reference pivot are on
the same subnet, WISE checks up to five inference rules, all
corresponding to different scenarii. If both addresses verify at
least one rule, then they will be considered as being part of
the same subnet.
The five inference rules are the following:
• Rule 1: both addresses have the same trail.
• Rule 2: both addresses do not share the same trail, but
are located at the same TTL distance and their trails differ
regarding anomalies (as explained in Sec. II-B).
• Rule 3: both addresses are located at the same TTL
distance and exhibit echoing trails.
• Rule 4: both addresses are located at the same TTL
distance and their trails, previously aliased, are flickering
with each other.
• Rule 5: both addresses are not located at the same TTL
distance and do not share the same trail. However, trail
addresses were aliased during the analysis of flickering
IP interfaces, meaning they belong to the same device
reached through asymmetrical paths.
It should be noted that rule 2 is a way to ensure that an IP
interface located at the same distance as all other IP addresses
in a subnet is not identified as an outlier because its trail
could not be discovered accurately (most likely because of
a network issue). While testing this rule, WISE also considers
replacing the reference pivot if the candidate address has a
better trail (i.e., less or no anomalies). Addresses not satisfying
any rule will be considered as potential contra-pivots if their
TTL distance is lower than for pivots, and outliers otherwise.
When all candidate addresses have been checked, WISE
checks how many of them were identified on the subnet
and how many potential contra-pivots were found to consider
stopping the subnet growth or going further. Typically, WISE
keeps expanding when no outlier has been found or when
outliers are a minority among candidate IP addresses.8 It will
shrink otherwise, and also stop if it discovers valid contra-
pivots (because the subnet will be already sound at this point).
It will also shrink if there are too many possible contra-pivots
(because they could actually be pivots of another subnet). Of
course, WISE also has to consider some specific scenarii (like
when the selected pivot turns out to be a contra-pivot), but we
will leave these details for interested readers.9
We however note two things. First, WISE processes back-
wards the addresses list. Indeed, many of our observations
showed that contra-pivots are usually found among the first
subnet addresses. Going backwards therefore ensures we can
maximize the final subnet size, as going the other way around
might prematurely stop the inference. Second, WISE also im-
plements a subnet post-processing stage to merge consecutive
(with respect to the address space) subnets whose pivots look
to be on the same subnet, if they were flagged as potentially
undergrown during inference (e.g., if expanding them made
them overlap previously inferred subnet containing a contra-
pivot) to fix situations where a subnet might be split in
several chunks. It should be noted, however, that the current
post-processing is still being improved. We believe, however,
that careful inference as performed by WISE combined with
careful post-processing could lead to overall better inference.
D. Complexity
We argue that the subnet inference has a linear complexity
with respects to the amount of addresses to aggregate in
subnets. There are two possible worst cases which could lead
to a given interface being considered multiple times. The first
scenario is the one where the network exclusively consists
of very small subnets containing a single interface (e.g., a
/32 or /31 prefix). Upon expanding the subnet to consider
8Currently, WISE considers outliers a minority if there make up less than
1/3 of candidate addresses. This will become a parameter in a future release.
9https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/v1/
a smaller prefix length, one or two other IP addresses will
be encompassed, but as they will not be compatible with the
current interface, it will be put back in the list of interfaces
and therefore considered a second time at the next iteration.
Therefore, in this scenario, all addresses are considered up to
three times, which remains a bounded amount of times. The
other worst possible scenario is the one where the network
consists of consecutive subnets which the prefix length slowly
increases. Indeed, the last expansion (assuming it occurs) of
the first will encompass all other IPs, but as they are on dif-
ferent subnets, they will be put back in the list, after what the
same scenario will occur but on a smaller scale. In the end, the
interfaces of the smallest subnet will be considered as many
times as they are subnets. However, if we compute the amount
of times an interface (no matter the subnet) is evaluated, then
it is bounded by N + N/2 + N/4 + ... = 2N (where N is
the amount of interfaces). Therefore, the complexity of subnet
inference as done by WISE is linear.
IV. VALIDATION
In this section, we validate, relying on groundtruth topolo-
gies, the ability of WISE to accurately reveal subnets and to
perform overall better than state-of-the-art tools.
A. Methodology
To validate WISE, we measure two groundtruth topolo-
gies with both WISE and a state-of-the-art tool: TreeNET.
TreeNET [10] is a topology discovery tool built upon
ExploreNET [9] by adding subnet refinement algorithms and
heuristics, leading to a better subnet inference and a lower
execution time. The last version of TreeNET allows one to
output inferred subnets before any refinement (providing so
topologies as seen by ExploreNET) and after refinement.
Doing so, we can compare WISE to both TreeNET and
ExploreNET regarding subnet accuracy in a single shot. We
fully describe our validation approach and provide some useful
scripts in our online repository. 10
Our groundtruth networks consist of an academic network,
spanning over roughly a /16 prefix (i.e., a bit more than 65,355
addresses), and the backbone of a major Belgian ISP, which
encompasses several hundreds of thousands of IP addresses. 11
For each groundtruth, we ran both WISE and TreeNET from
a single vantage point located inside the academic network and
from a PlanetLab node for the Belgian ISP. Both measurement
campaigns were run in February 2019.
B. Results
To validate WISE and compare its performance with the
state of the art, we introduce the notion of subnet distance,
computed as follows: for each subnet in the groundtruth, we
look for similar subnets in our measurements, either identical
or overlapping, and compute the difference in bits between the
prefix lengths. A value of 0 in the subnet distance corresponds
10https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Validation
11For security and confidentiality concerns, we will not make our datasets
available for those groundtruth networks.
(a) Academic Network. (b) ISP Network.
Fig. 3. Subnet distance of inferred subnets on our groundtruths.
to a perfect inference, meaning the inferred prefix perfectly
fits the groundtruth. A subnet distance < 0 corresponds to
overgrown subnets, while positive values refer to undergrown
subnets. If we plot the ratios of groundtruth subnets over-
lapping inferred subnets for each subnet distance (on the X
axis), we expect the curve to be heavily centered around 0,
suggesting thus the inference tool performs well with respect
to the groundtruth.
In the presence of errors, it is worth noticing that we prefer
subnet distance to be positive (i.e., undergrown subnets) for
two reasons. First, the lack of live interfaces in a part of
the subnet address space can simply prevent the inference of
its true prefix length, and therefore, an undergrown subnet
can still be faithful to the actual topology. For instance, a
/24 subnet where only addresses in the first half are being
used in practice will typically be revealed as a /25 by WISE.
Overgrown subnets, on the other hand, typically spans over
multiple actual subnets and therefore cannot be considered as
sound with respect to the actual topology. Second, undergrown
subnets that are consecutive with respect to the address space
can be compared and post-processed to recover the true prefix.
Fig. 3 provides the ratios of groundtruth subnets being
overlapped by our inferred subnets with respect to the subnet
distance for both our groundtruth networks. In particular,
Fig. 3a focuses on the academic network, while Fig. 3b on the
Belgian ISP. On both figures, WISE (plain line) is compared to
TreeNET (dashed line) and ExploreNET (dotted line). The
blue vertical line at subnet distance 0 is a marker for the perfect
situation. Generally speaking, both figures show that WISE is
able to reveal as much exact prefixes as TreeNET. In addition,
when focusing on errors, WISE is capable of providing subnets
for which the prefix length differs from the groundtruth by a
single bit. Also, WISE generates more undergrown subnets
(subnet distance > 0) and less overgrown subnets compared
to TreeNET. As we explained earlier, this is a desirable
result, as undergrown subnets can either still be a realistic
estimation, or be merged with other undergrown subnets to
recover the actual subnet. In other words, WISE manages
to provide noticeably better results than TreeNET while
being more careful when it comes to large subnets. Finally,
subnets discovered by ExploreNET are mostly located at
the right side of each figure, meaning it generates much more
undergrown subnets than both WISE and ExploreNET. Such
a result is not surprising: indeed, TreeNET was designed
to refine subnets discovered by ExploreNET in order to
TreeNET WISE
Academic network Execution time 54’33 21’38Amount of probes 19,136 26,831
Belgian ISP Execution time 11:32’24 34’27Amount of probes 290,949 278,329
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OF TREENET AND WISE.
better identify larger subnets, which ExploreNET tends to
chunk [10]. Finally, we note that both our groundtruths are
good settings for TreeNET, as phenomena like flickering and
warping are uncommon with them. In a less propitious setting,
we expect TreeNET to output more aberrant results.
We also take a closer look at performance during the subnet
inference step of each tool. Table I shows the execution time
of both TreeNET and WISE on each network as well as the
total amount of probes sent by each. In both situations, WISE
completes subnet inference much faster than TreeNET, and
this is especially true on a large network such as the Belgian
ISP. Indeed, the subnet inference as performed by TreeNET
required hours of execution while WISE only took about half
an hour, mostly because TreeNET considers a single subnet
at once in a given thread (the bigger the subnet, the slower the
execution time), while WISE will use the same thread to probe
and study multiple IP addresses at a steady rate. This being
said, WISE is also clearly more intensive in terms of probing,
mostly due to its way of scanning the target IP addresses and
scheduling probing work (including re-probing of target IP
addresses which could not be successfully scanned) to get
all the data it needs for (offline) subnet inference as quickly
as possible, but remains very reasonable. In the case of the
Belgian ISP, WISE sent on average 135 probes per second,
which amounts to 7,560 bytes of data, assuming our typical
probe is an ICMP probe (around 32 bytes) encapsulated in an
IP packet (which the header adds a 24 bytes overhead).
V. MEASUREMENTS IN THE WILD
We now discuss the data we collected in the wild using the
PlanetLab testbed. We use this data to show that WISE can
find a good amount of sound-looking subnets in the wild as
well as to demonstrate that WISE is able to re-discover the
same subnets in a target domain whatever the vantage point
location used in a measurement campaign. Our full dataset is
publicly available online. 12
A. Subnet Soundness Rules
In the absence of a groundtruth to assess the measurements
validity, we have to define criteria indicating whether a given
subnet is sound or aberrant. Ideally, a subnet should be as close
as possible to the ideal definition used by state-of-the-art tools,
but we should let room for situations where distances towards
pivots (TTL-wise) are not all equal. We therefore define 3
rules for ensuring the soundness of a subnet: the contra-pivot
rule, the spread rule, and the outlier rule.
The contra-pivot rule simply states that an ideal subnet
should feature at least one interface viewed as a contra-pivot,
as a subnet lacking one could be only a part of a larger subnet.
12https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Dataset
The spread rule states that, in the presence of contra-pivots,
these interfaces are either in minority for large subnets, either
no more common than pivots for small subnets (i.e., the prefix
length 29 or greater). Finally, a subnet fulfilling the outlier
rule is simply a subnet containing no other interfaces than
pivots and contra-pivots. A subnet satisfying the three rules is
considered as sound, and if the TTL distances of the pivots
are identical while the contra-pivot(s) is (are) found exactly
one hop sooner, then the subnet satisfies the ideal definition
of previous state-of-the-art subnet inference tools.
It is worth noting that revealing a given subnet prefix from
different vantage points does not mean that the prefixes will
meet exactly the same soundness rules. For instance, it is
always possible that the subnet revealed from vantage point
X features an outlier, while the same subnet revealed from
vantage point Y will exhibit highly varying distances, making
the contra-pivot interface detection difficult. Our rules are thus
also a good indicator on how various vantage points (and,
consequently, the different paths towards the targeted domain)
can increase the difficulty of inferring a given subnet, due to
(for instance) traffic engineering, as discussed in Sec. II.
B. Measurement Methodology
Starting from December 28th, 2018 up to the end of Febru-
ary 2019, we measured 27 different ASes of varying sizes
(from small stub ASes to large transit ASes covering roughly
four millions of IP addresses) from the PlanetLab testbed.
We fully measured each AS using a single PlanetLab node
as a vantage point and repeated the measurements on a daily
basis, with the exception of some large ASes (such as AS2497
and AS9198) that required up to two days of measurement to
be entirely scanned. Just like our evaluation of trail issues
discussed in Sec. II-C, we changed our vantage point at each
measurement run to assess the effects of measuring a same
target domain from different perspectives, implementing in
practice a rotation of our vantage points. Our scripts for
scheduling measurements are publicly available online. 13
C. Observations in the Wild
To assess the soundness of our measurements, we first plot
the amount of subnets collected for a given AS over a given
period of time and show how many of these subnets fulfill
a certain amount of rules (as presented in Sec. V-A). As we
measured 27 ASes and scheduled several campaigns, we only
show here the most typical cases to elaborate on how WISE
performs in the wild. Interested readers can refer to our public
repository for additional results. 14
Fig. 4 shows our results for both AS6453 (Fig. 4a) and
AS3257 (Fig. 4b). It gives the amounts of inferred subnets
(bottom part of the figure) and their soundness as ratios (top
part of the figure). Both figures were generated with data
collected during the first half of February 2019. The first major
result highlighted by these figures is that all subnets fulfill at
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Fig. 5. Persistence of subnets (February 2019).
of the time, this rule is the outlier rule. In other words, WISE
is able to infer a large majority of subnets (above 95%) that
are free of outliers, showing that its subnet inference is very
careful and rarely produces aberrant subnets. The other result
is that the amount of subnets fulfilling the three rules is also
considerable, with several datasets having more than 60% of
subnets fulfilling all rules in the case of AS6453. The ratios of
subnets fulfilling only two rules is fairly low, however, but they
all correspond to cases where there is at least one contra-pivot
and where the presence of outliers or the amount of contra-
pivot interfaces violates the outlier rule or the spread rule,
respectively. Another interesting result is that WISE is rather
constant in the soundness of its inference despite the highly
varying difficulties encountered with the selected ASes (see
Sec. II-C), though the ratio of sound subnets (i.e. fulfilling
all rules) can sometimes have a sudden drop. Interestingly,
this drop can correspond to situations where WISE discovered
more subnets, as shown by Fig. 4b. As the amount of alive
IP addresses did not change that much between datasets, this
suggests the subnets discovered during previous measurement
campaigns were actually chunked because of new difficulties
induced by additional traffic engineering.
We also take a look at the persistence of subnets across
various measurement runs. A subnet is said to be (weakly)
persistent if its prefix is present in two datasets collected from
different vantage points. It is said to be strictly persistent if
both measurements fulfill the same amount of rules (defined
in Sec. V-A). A weakly persistent subnet demonstrates two
things: first, changing the vantage point from one run to
another can lead to issues as described in Sec. II-C. This
will worsen the quality of the dataset and make the measured
subnet look less sound. Second, this shows WISE can recover
the same subnets despite these issues to some extent.
Fig. 5 shows the persistence of subnets for the same ASes as
before on the same dates, using each time the first collected
dataset as reference dataset (i.e., all subsequent datasets are
compared to this one). The results show that the subnets
discovered by WISE have a good persistence overall, with a
majority of strictly persistent subnets in both situations for
most datasets. The noticeable amount of persistent subnets
fulfilling a different amount of rules for each dataset shows,
on the other hand, that each measurement comes with a certain
amount of subnets that differs from previous measurements.
An interesting observation to make is that the persistent sub-
nets drop (both in the weak and the strict sense) on February
4th, 2019 for AS3257 correlates with the drop of subnets
fulfilling all rules on the same date (compare Fig. 4b and
5b). Moreover, the amount of subnets being weakly persistent
is noticeably greater than for any other dataset, supporting so
the idea that traffic engineering or measurement issues can
both decrease the soundness of the measurement and cause
previously measured subnets to appear differently as well.
In particular, outliers can appear from one measurement to
another, or warping interfaces can make the distances of both
pivots and contra-pivots vary.
To give a practical example, one can look at the sub-
net 129.242.88.0/21 WISE regularly discovered in AS224
(UNINETT). In most measurements, the subnet appears with a
single contra-pivot and very regular distances (all pivots being
located at the same TTL), a result that can be seen in the
dataset collected on February 2nd, 2019. However, on February
8th and February 10th, the same subnet appeared with highly
varying TTLs for the pivots, with the former dataset having
pivots at respectively 16 or 18 hops and the latter at 21 and
24 hops. Hopefully, the contra-pivot always appearing sooner,
all measurements remain sound w.r.t. our usual criteria. All
our figures and scripts to study the persistence of subnets are
available in our public repository. 15
Overall, our measurements show that, while choosing the
vantage point is still important to maximize accuracy of the
subnet inference, a tool such as WISE can mitigate pretty well
traffic engineering issues with a few exceptions. As we lack
of space to show more figures, we encourage readers to take
a look at our repository to see all figures. In particular, we
also provide figures showing the distribution of subnet prefix
lengths in our datasets. 16 These additional figures demonstrate
WISE can discover all kinds of prefix length though the
distribution of these lengths will usually follow a power-law
shape (30 and 31 being the most common prefix lengths), as
already pointed out previously in the literature [9].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterized and quantified measurement
phenomena that can increase the difficulty of subnet inference,
and introduced a new tool, WISE, which can detect and work
around these issues without modifying the collected data. As
our validation on simple groundtruth networks showed, WISE
15https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Persistence
16https://github.com/JefGrailet/WISE/tree/master/Evaluation/Prefixes
is perfectly able to compete with state-of-the-art tools in terms
of subnet soundness but is also capable of outperforming them
in terms of execution time, thanks to its design emphasizing
linear complexity at all algorithmic steps.
Measurements in the wild with WISE showed that taking
into account issues such as warping and flickering addresses
can mitigate very well the effects of traffic engineering which
vary from one vantage point to another, despite that some
drastic changes can still occur from one vantage point to
another. In other words, while selecting a good vantage point
remains important, carefully designing subnet inference can
mitigate rather well issues which depend on it. Further research
into the selection of a good vantage point could be the next
step for achieving subnet inference that is both accurate and
efficient. It should also be noted that subnet post-processing as
performed by WISE is still in its infancy, and that considering
more possible scenarii could further improve inference.
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